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Abstract
A proposed Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) is evaluated against the traditional
Attitude Indicator (AI). To understand the merit of this research, U.S. Air Force Class A
spatial disorientation (SD) mishaps over the past 21 years were analyzed. This analysis
applied Human Factors Analysis and Classification System codes to determine mishaps
involving SD. This data was combined with data from the Reliability and Maintainability
Information System to determine accident rates per flight hour. Seventy-two SD mishaps
were analyzed, resulting in the loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft since fiscal year (FY)
1993 for a total cost of $2.32 billion. Results indicate that future SD research should be
focused on fighter/attack and helicopter platforms. With these results as the motivation,
the graphical portions of the ASD were compared to the AI through a desktop flight
simulation experiment in which participants used each display to recover from unusual
attitudes. Participants completed recovery tasks approximately 2 seconds faster with the
AI, on average. This time difference was greatest for participants having flight
experience. Survey responses revealed that certain ASD design choices could be
beneficial. Further investigation of the ASD is recommended as are updates to the Air
Force safety center database.
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SPATIAL DISORIENTATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

I. Introduction
General Issue
Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. When suffering from SD, pilots naturally tend
to make aircraft inputs and controls that may create safe flight in their perceived
orientation, but result in unsafe flight in reality. These inputs often cause the aircraft to
enter unusual attitudes which may include unperceived inversions, steep climbs, and
sharp dives. These unusual attitudes brought on by SD thus immensely increase the risk
of a mishap. Across the U.S. Air Force, SD mishaps are both prevalent and costly. In fact,
SD was implicated in 20.2% of Air Force Class A mishaps between the years 1991 and
2000. These 20.2% cost the Air Force $1.4B and claimed 60 lives [2].
Pilots often use displays and instruments in the cockpit to determine their
orientation when a view of the outside world is degraded by weather, darkness, or a
perceived visual illusion. Particularly when suffering from SD, pilots are instructed to
focus only on their instruments to discern their aircraft’s attitude. The first
instrumentation to combat SD was an attitude indicator (AI) known as the Sperry
Horizon, originally developed in 1928 by Elmer Sperry Jr. of the Sperry Corporation [3].
Since that time, despite some known human factors and training issues, this attitude
instrument and display has become standard in most instrumented aircraft cockpits [4]
and is generally replicated in electronic form within even the most modern American
1

aircraft cockpits. However, this instrument may not effectively combat spatial
disorientation since mishaps involving spatial disorientation continue to occur across all
forms of flight [2].
Problem Statement
SD is a problem that is not fully understood at this time. An in-depth review of
past major SD mishaps must be performed to better understand and unfold the
phenomenon, in terms of the factors that are highly correlated with SD mishaps.
Additionally, potential paths forward must be scientifically analyzed to determine their
utility in mitigating or minimizing the effects of SD. Specifically, a newly proposed
attitude display, the Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) which differs from the current
AI in several significant ways, will be analyzed with regard to its utility in SD
mitigation/avoidance.
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses
1)

How prevalent is SD, in terms of the frequency of Class A mishaps per flight
hour across the Air Force?

2)

How costly is SD, in terms of financial cost, human lives lost, and aircraft
destroyed?

3)

What factors are correlated with SD mishaps?
a)

Do certain aircraft types have a significantly higher rate of
SD mishaps per flight hour?

b)

Does a higher rate of SD mishaps per flight hour occur during the
day or at night?
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c)
4)

Does fatigue play a role in the incidence of SD mishaps?

How does the proposed ASD compare to the traditional AI in terms
of learnability/transfer-of-training, pilot preference, and speed and accuracy of
response to SD?
a)

Learnability/transfer-of-training - Will inexperienced
participants achieve better/faster performance with the ASD than
with the traditional AI? Will experienced pilots perform as well
with the ASD as they do with the AI, given their years of
experience with the AI?

b)

Pilot Preference - Will participants of all experience levels indicate
higher preference of ASD or the traditional AI? Which aspects of
ASD will they most like/dislike?

c)

Speed of Response to SD - Will participants using
ASD complete recovery more rapidly than pilots using the
traditional AI?

d)

Accuracy of Response to SD - Will pilots using ASD commit
fewer control reversals when recovering from UAs than
pilots using the traditional AI? Will pilots using ASD
recoverfrom unusual attitudes (UAs) more accurately (i.e. closer to
perfectly) than pilots using the traditional AI?

5)

How can the information learned from ASD contribute to the general body of
knowledge of attitude displays?

3

Research Focus
This research effort was divided into two parts. The first was focused on an
analysis of U.S. Air Force SD aviation mishaps. Specifically, its purpose was to
determine the prevalence and impact of past mishaps, the environmental conditions in
which they are more likely to occur, the types of aircraft most likely to be involved, and
the impact of crew size. Although many of these factors have been addressed in the
previous literature, the current study relied on HFACS nanocodes for indicating mishaps
involving SD and combined safety data with reliability data to permit the mishap rate to
be computed as a function of flight hours.
The second part sought to understand a new attitude display that has been
proposed by Pilot Disorientation Prevention Technologies (PDPT). The proposed ASD
aims to minimize and mitigate the risks and effects of SD. The ASD differs in three
significant fashions from the Sperry-style AI. First, it draws the pilot’s attention by way
of an auditory alarm when it determines that SD may be setting in. Second, the display
employs a potentially more intuitive (moving-aircraft, stationary-horizon) graphical
interface to aid pilots in determining their attitude. Finally, the ASD provides a specific,
recommended course of action to aid the pilot in rapid recovery. While each of these
differences is intended to improve to the Sperry-style AI, the second part of this research
focused on comparing the graphical depiction in the ASD to the traditional AI.

4

Investigative Questions
1)

What will be participants’ average time to complete recovery for each display?

2)

What will be participant’s average RMS error from perfect recovery for each
display?

3)

How many control errors will participants make with each display, on average?

Methodology
Data was obtained from the United States Air Force Safety Center’s, Air Force
Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for the 21 years from fiscal years 1993 through 2013
using the integrated Data Extraction Tool. Mishaps were categorized as SD or non-SD
using HFACS. Air Force flying time distributions over the same time period were
gathered from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS). This
data was applied to normalize the mishap data from AFSAS to determine incident rates
per million flight hours for each of several potential predictor variables.
A desktop computer based, non-moving flight simulator was used to compare the
graphical depiction of the ASD to the traditional AI. Participants were selected from all
flight experience levels and were asked to recover from already in-progress unusual
attitudes in the flight simulation. Metrics such as the number of control errors, the time to
complete recovery, and the root mean square error from perfect recovery were collected.
Assumptions/Limitations
1)

The analysis of past mishaps was limited by inconsistent reporting of SD mishaps
and a lack of accessibility to AF flying time distributions categorized by location.
It assumed that categorization of SD mishaps in AFSAS was completely accurate
5

and that data from AFSAS and REMIS encapsulated all AF mishaps and flight
time.
2)

The attitude display experiment was limited by the use of a non-moving desktop
flight simulator, by a small sample size, and by a difficulty in recruiting novice
participants. It assumed that participants put forth their best effort with both
displays and that participants could not predict the scenarios they would
encounter.

Implications
SD costs the AF over a billion dollars per decade. In addition to being extremely
expensive, SD is poorly understood and often fatal. This thesis research hopes to make
strides in achieving better comprehension of SD by determining which conditions have
been highly correlated with SD occurrence. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to the body
of knowledge of attitude displays which may inhibit or mitigate the effects of SD. Using
the knowledge gained through this research, aviation communities worldwide could
benefit from saving countless dollars, aircraft, and lives.
Preview
Chapter II of this manuscript is a scholarly article detailing the analysis of past
Air Force SD mishaps and serves as motivation for SD mitigation research. As an
example of this type of research, Chapter III is a scholarly article detailing the experiment
which compares the newly proposed ASD and the traditional AI. Chapter IV provides
general conclusions and recommends future research in this field of study.
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II. Air Force Spatial Disorientation Mishap Trends 1993-2013
Robert J. Poisson III and Michael E. Miller
Systems Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology

The following chapter was submitted to the Aviation, Space, and Environmental
Medicine Journal. The analysis performed within this paper was completed entirely by
the author of this thesis under the advisement of his thesis committee. Further support
was provided from Colonel Glenn Hover who initially suggested this analysis and who
was kind enough to help the author gain access to AFSAS.
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Abstract
Background: Spatial disorientation is a significant factor in a large percentage of
military Class A aviation mishaps. While previous studies analyzed accident statistics,
they often suffer from methodological flaws which lead to questionable conclusions.
Methods: The current study relied upon the Air Force Safety Automated System to
document U.S. Air Force Class A mishap investigations during the past 21 years. Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System codes were used to determine mishaps
involving pilot spatial disorientation. This data was combined with data from the
Reliability and Maintainability Information System to determine the accident rate per
flight hour.

Results: Seventy-two spatial disorientation (SD) mishaps were analyzed

resulting in loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft since fiscal year (FY) 1993 for a total cost of
$2.32 billion. Class A mishaps involving spatial disorientation had a higher odds ratio as
a function of hours flown for helicopter and fighter/attack fixed wing aircraft than for
other aircraft. Additionally, odds ratios for F-15 and single seat fighter/attack aircraft
were only marginally larger than for other fighter/attack aircraft. Although SD mishaps
at night had similar odds ratios to daytime SD mishaps when normalized by flight hours,
SD mishaps account for a larger percent of the total Class A mishaps during the night
than during the day. Discussion: SD mishaps were analyzed in terms of Class A
mishaps per million flight hours. Results indicate that future SD research should be
focused on fighter/attack and helicopter platforms. Updates to the Air Force safety center
database are recommended.

Keywords: Aircraft Mishaps, Situation Awareness, HFACS
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Introduction
Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. Several previous research studies have shown
that mishaps involving SD are very uncommon (as low as 0.5% of all mishaps) [2] while
others have claimed that SD accidents are highly underreported [3]. Because of a
burgeoning understanding of the phenomenon, SD reporting procedures are not
standardized throughout aviation, across the United States Department of Defense or
even within branches of the U.S. military. As the costs and dangers associated with SD
have been uncovered, research has expanded to facilitate more accurate classification of
SD mishaps [4].
The ability of humans to perceive their three-dimensional orientation in space is
rooted in our ability to accurately interpret various sensory inputs. These inputs come
mainly from the eyes, the vestibular system located in the inner ear, and the haptic nerves
of the skin [5]. In the typical human environment (i.e. standing or sitting on the surface of
Earth) the sensations provided by these sources are almost always adequate. They
provide a stable frame of reference from which we can detect movement and motion in
three dimensions [5]. However, once a human being leaves the surface of Earth, enters
into flight and experiences forces other than gravity, these sensory organs do not always
perform in a desirable manner. Thankfully, confusing vestibular or proprioceptive signals
are nearly always overridden by visual input as pilots can usually determine their
orientation with respect to Earth based upon ground reference information. However,
when visibility is limited in poor weather or at night, pilots must use an attitude indicator
9

in coordination with other instruments in the cockpit to determine their orientation. This
action requires cognitive effort on the part of the pilot [6]. This effort is necessary
because unlike interpreting typical orientation cues on the ground, the pilot does not have
decades of experience interpreting cues from airborne artificial displays.
While several studies have analyzed historical aircraft mishaps in an attempt to
understand the factors contributing to SD, these studies often suffer from the lack of data
to provide convincing results. For example, as indicated by Sundstrom, to understand
accident rates as a function of aircraft type or weather condition, one must normalize the
number of accidents by the number of flight hours within the corresponding conditions
[7]. This data is rarely available and is not typically captured within safety databases.
Therefore, previous research often applied proxies for flight hours. Lyons and
colleagues normalized the number of United States Air Force Mishaps from 1990 through
2004 by the number of sorties flown [8]. While the number of sorties is a reasonable
proxy for flight hours within a given aircraft platform, the use of this metric will skew
results when comparing across platforms since helicopter, fixed-wing fighter/attack
aircraft, and bomber or transport aircraft can vary greatly in sortie duration. Other
common errors present in the literature include relying on poorly classified information
for identifying accidents involving spatial disorientation or misclassification of aircraft
attributes.
Earlier research has illuminated many of these issues, leading to improvement in
mishap databases and mishap classification. For example, the adoption of Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has provided a more reliable
method for classifying aircraft mishaps [9]. This classification scheme has been adopted
10

across much of the United States aviation community, permitting more reliable
classification and sorting of mishaps.
The current research effort was focused on an analysis of U.S. Air Force SD
aviation mishaps. Specifically, its purpose was to determine the prevalence and impact of
past mishaps, the environmental conditions in which they are more likely to occur, the
types of aircraft most likely to be involved, and the impact of crew size. Although many
of these factors have been addressed in the previous literature, the current study relied on
HFACS nanocodes for indicating mishaps involving SD and combined safety data with
reliability data to permit the mishap rate to be computed as a function of flight hours.
Method
Data was obtained from the United States Air Force Safety Center’s, Air Force
Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for the 21 years from fiscal years 1993 through 2013
using the integrated Data Extraction Tool (DET). This tool permitted relevant
information for Class A mishaps within this interval to be exported for further analysis in
Microsoft Excel and JMP 10. The resulting database included data on every U.S. Air
Force Class A SD mishap, where a Class A mishap is defined as a mishap resulting in
more than two million dollars in damages or a loss of life [10].
SD mishaps were defined as any mishap that references an SD nanocode in
HFACS. This system allows the safety investigation board (SIB) to classify mishaps
based on their causal factors and major contributors. A reference to an HFACS SD
nanocode indicates that the mishap in question involved SD. While these nanocodes are
assigned by various individuals and it is possible that the threshold for considering SD as
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a major contributor will likely vary with the person assigning the nanocode, the use of
this standardized method should be more reliable than the use of other methods, including
the “one-liners” as reported in some previous research [6].
Air Force flying time distributions over the same time period (fiscal years 1993
through 2013) were gathered from the Reliability and Maintainability Information
System (REMIS). This data was applied to normalize the mishap data from AFSAS to
determine incident rates per million flight hours for each of several potential predictor
variables. The number of mishaps associated with each variable was normalized by the
number of flight hours associated with each variable. Comparison of these incidence rates
created rate ratios which indicate the proportion of incident rates between two predictor
variables. The Pearson Chi-Square test was then applied in JMP 10 to determine the
statistical significance of any differences.
Results
A total of 601 Class A mishaps were identified for analysis, including 72 Class A
mishaps involving SD. During the analysis period, Air Force aircraft logged more than
44 million hours of flight. Therefore, 13.5 Class A mishaps occurred per million hours of
flight with 1.6 of these accidents involving SD. The SD-related mishaps resulted in the
loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total monetary cost of $2.32 billion. Irrelevant of
SD, the 601 total Class A mishaps resulted in the loss of 406 lives, 368 aircraft and a
monetary cost of $13.04 billion. This shows that while SD Class A mishaps only account
for 12.0% of the total number of Class A mishaps, they account for 17.7% of the lost
aircraft, 17.8% of the cost, and a staggering 24.9% of the lives lost as the SD mishaps
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produced 34.1% of the fatal mishaps. Interestingly, 16.1% (85) of the non-SD mishaps
resulted in a fatality, 61.1% (44) of the SD-related mishaps resulted in a fatality. These
calculations are consolidated in Table 1, below. These findings are supported by Gibb
and colleagues who claimed that SD is the leading cause of pilot fatalities [3].
Table 1(II). Comparison of Air Force Losses from SD Class A Mishaps to all Class A
Mishaps.

SD
Total
Proportion

Total Mishaps
(#)
72
601
12.0%

Fatal Mishaps %
(#)
61.1(44)
(129)
34.1%

Lives Lost
101
406
24.9%

Aircraft
Lost
65
368
17.7%

Cost ($B)
2.32
13.04
17.8%

Using the information in Table 1, an odds ratio indicated that the odds of a fatality
are 8.21 times higher in a Class A mishap involving SD than in a non-SD mishap (χ2(1,
N=601) = 76.28, p≤0.0001)). Thus, major accidents caused by SD are more likely to
result in death than those caused by other factors.
Aircraft Type
This analysis included a number of aircraft models and classes to include single and dualseat Fighter/Attack, Trainers, Transport, Bombers, and Helicopters, among others, as
shown in Table 2.
Table 2(II). Aircraft Flight Hours and Mishap Rates.
Aircraft

Single Seat F/A
A-10
F-15 A/C
F-16 A/C
F-117
F-22
Two-Seat Fighter
F-15 B/D/E

Flight Hours (M)

SD Mishap Rate
(#SD Mishaps)

Fatality Rate
(#Fatal SD Mishaps)

2.35
1.96
5.78
0.19
0.16

3.83(9)
1.02(2)
3.46(20)
5.32(1)
6.30(1)

2.56(6)
0(0)
2.42(14)
5.32(1)
6.30(1)

1.56

2.56(4)

1.92(3)
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F-16 B/D
F-4
Trainer
T-3
T-6
T-37
T-38
Transport
C-5
C-17
C-141
CV-22
C-12
Bomber
B-1
B-52
Helicopter
H-60
H-53
H-1
Other
E-8
U-2
U-28

1.00
0.095

5.00(5)
10.55(1)

4.00(4)
0(0)

0.083
1.47
2.40
2.81

12.02(1)
0.68(1)
0.42(1)
0.71(2)

12.02(1)
0.68(1)
0(0)
0.36(1)

1.25
2.46
1.20
0.031
0.44

0.80(1)
0.81(2)
0.83(1)
32.09(1)
2.25(1)

0(0)
0(0)
0.83(1)
32.09(1)
2.25(1)

0.52
0.50

3.87(2)
2.00(1)

1.94(1)
2.00(1)

0.55
0.18
0.50

12.77(7)
5.47(1)
4.02(2)

7.30(4)
5.47(1)
0(0)

0.16
0.25
UNK

6.37(1)
12.05(3)
UNK(1)

0(0)
4.02(1)
UNK(1)

In terms of aircraft type, 59.7% (43) of the SD mishaps involved aircraft with
fighter/attack (F/A) designations. However, only 55.2% (292) of the non-SD mishaps
involved F/A aircraft. Therefore, the odds of a Class A mishap involving SD are 1.20
times higher for F/A aircraft than all other aircraft, though this rate was not statistically
significant (χ2(1, N=601) = 0.53, p=0.47)). However, once the mishaps are normalized
by flight hours, the incidence of SD-related F/A aircraft Class A mishaps is found to be
3.15 per million flight hours, while the same statistic for non-fighter/attack, fixed-wing
aircraft is 0.61 SD-related Class A mishaps per million flight hours. Therefore, the rate
of SD-related Class A mishaps was found to be 5.15 times higher for F/A aircraft than for
all other fixed-wing aircraft. These figures are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3(II). Incidence and rate ratios for fighter/attack and non-fighter/attack aircraft.

F/A
Non-F/A

Flight
Hours
13.7M
29.4M

SD Mishaps

Rate per
Million
3.15
0.61

43
18

Ratio (FA/non-FA)
5.15

In terms of aircraft type, 14.1% (10) of the SD mishaps involved helicopters
(excluding the tilt-rotor CV-22), while only 7.4% (39) of non-SD mishaps involved
helicopters. Therefore, the odds of a Class A mishap involving SD are 2.05 times higher
for helicopters than all other aircraft (χ2(1, N=598) = 3.716, p=0.054)). However,
helicopters accounted for only 2.8% of the flight hours accrued within the sample as
indicated by Figure 4. Once the mishap rate is calculated as a function of flight hours, a
larger effect is observed. Helicopters incur 8.11 SD mishaps per million flight hours,
while their fixed-wing counterparts incur only 1.42 SD mishaps per million flight hours.
Thus, helicopters are involved in SD mishaps at 5.73 times the rate of fixed-wing aircraft.
Like F/A aircraft, helicopters within the Air Force arsenal are more prone than the
average aircraft to SD-related Class A mishaps.
Table 4(II). Incidence and rate ratios for Helicopter and Fixed-Wing aircraft.

Helicopter
Fixed-Wing

Flight
Hours
1.2M
43.1M

SD Mishaps
10
61

Rate per
Million
8.11
1.42

Ratio
5.73

As shown in Table 2, the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon has been
involved in 34.7% (25) of the Air Force SD-related mishaps, a relatively large proportion.
However, all other F/A aircraft have been involved in 25% (18) of SD mishaps. Thus,
this analysis would indicate that the F-16 is not significantly more likely than the all other
F/A aircraft to experience SD-related Class A mishaps (χ2(1, N=335) = 0.001, p=0.974)).
15

After normalizing based on flight hours, the F-16 is involved in 3.69 SD-related Class A
mishaps per million flight hours, which is 1.41 times the rate of 2.62 mishaps per million
flight hours for all other F/A aircraft, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5(II). Incidence and rate ratios for F-16 and all other fighter/attack aircraft.
Flight Hours
F-16
Other F/A

6.8M
6.9M

SD
Mishaps
25
18

Rate per
Million
3.69
2.62

Ratio
(F-16/Other F/A)
1.41

Single-Seat vs. Multi-Seat
Of the SD mishaps, 48.6% (35) of them involved a single-seat aircraft, as opposed
to multi-seat fixed-wing aircraft. Of the non-SD mishaps, 50.5% (241) of them involved a
single-seat aircraft. Thus, this analysis indicates that single-seat aircraft are not
significantly more likely than the all other fixed-wing aircraft to experience SD-related
Class A mishaps (χ2(1, N=552) = 1.82, p=0.18). It was also found that when limiting the
analysis to only fighter/attack aircraft, single-seat F/A aircraft were no more likely than
their multi-seat F/A counterparts to experience SD mishaps (χ2(1, N=335) = 0.091,
p=0.76). This would seem to indicate that the aircraft crew size has no effect on the
probability of an SD mishap. However, once the Air Force flying hour distributions are
used to normalize the data, it is seen that the incidence rate per million flight hours is
actually much higher for single-seat aircraft (3.28 incidents per million flight hours), than
for multi-seat, fixed-wing aircraft (0.80 incidents per million flight hours). The associated
rate ratio for single-seat to multi-seat, fixed-wing aircraft was 4.09, indicating that lone
pilots suffer SD mishaps at over three times the rate of multi-person, fixed-wing aircrews.
This data is consolidated in Table 6. Since a great deal of the airframes fit into both the
16

single-seat and fighter/attack categories, a more appropriate comparison is single-seat
fighter/attack aircraft to multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft. As a result the rate per million
flight hours is 3.28 for single-seat F/A aircraft, which is comparable to the 3.15 mishaps
per million flight hours for multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft. Therefore, when comparing
single seat fighter/attack aircraft to multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft, having multiple seats
does not appear to significantly reduce the incidence of Class A SD mishaps.
Table 6(II). Incidence and rate ratios for single-seat and multi-seat fixed-wing aircraft.

Single-Seat
Multi-Seat

Flight
Hours
10.7M
32.4M

SD Mishaps

Rate per
Million
3.28
0.80

35
26

Ratio
(Single-Seat/Multi-Seat)
4.09

Time of Day
With regard to time of day, 52.8% (38) of SD-related Class A mishaps occurred
during nighttime operations. By comparison, only 20.2% (107) of all Class A mishaps
occurred at night, a significantly lower percent than observed for SD-related mishaps
(χ2(1, N=601) = 36.68, p≤0.0001)). Under these conditions, the odds that a Class A
mishap will involve SD are 4.41 times higher than non-SD mishaps. After normalizing
the data by flight hours, the rate ratio of nighttime to daytime SD mishaps was calculated
to be 1.16. Thus, SD mishaps occurred slightly more frequently at night than during the
day. However, when performing this same analysis for the non-SD mishaps, the ratio of
nighttime to daytime mishaps was only 0.32, indicating that non-SD mishaps occur much
more frequently during daytime. These values are consolidated in Table 7, below.
Regrettably, the collection and presentation of night vision goggle (NVG) use data in
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AFSAS was inconsistent and incomplete, and a proper statistical analysis could not be
performed.
Table 7(II). Incidence and rate ratios for Night and Day Mishaps.

Night
Day

Night
Day

Flight
Hours
22.1M
22.3M
Flight
Hours
22.1M
22.3M

SD Mishaps
38
33
Class A Mishaps
145
456

Rate per
Million
1.72
1.48
Rate per
Million
6.56
20.48

Ratio (Night/Day)
1.16
Ratio (Night/Day)
0.32

Fatigue
In the area of fatigue, 13.9% (10) of the SD mishaps cited fatigue as a possible
factor while only 5.7% (30) of non-SD mishaps cited fatigue as a possible factor. An
odds ratio analysis indicates that the odds of a mishap involving SD are 2.68 times higher
when fatigue is a possible factor than when it is not (χ2(1, N=601) = 6.889, p=0.0087)).
Discussion and Conclusions
Spatial disorientation has posed a significant problem to the U.S. Air Force since
the advent of aviation and continues to do so today. SD mishaps have cost the Air Force
more than 2 billion dollars and more than 100 lives over the past two decades. While SDrelated mishaps accounted for a relatively small number of the Class A mishaps, SDrelated mishaps are often catastrophic, being much more likely to result in loss of life,
loss of aircraft, and larger than average monetary losses than the other Class A mishaps.
SD-related mishaps account for 12% of the Class A mishaps but account for more than
34% of the fatal mishaps, 25% of the lost lives, 17% of the lost aircraft and 17% of the
monetary losses from Class A mishaps.
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Aircraft type was found to have a significant effect upon the likelihood of an SD
mishap. Although one might hypothesize that pilots of large aircraft might be likely to
experience SD due to slow aircraft movement (e.g., roll) which might be below the
threshold of the human vestibular or proprioceptive systems [5], the data indicates that
SD mishaps occur in fighter/attack aircraft or helicopters at more than 5 times the rate of
non-fighter/attack, fixed-wing aircraft when the number of SD mishaps are calculated as
a ratio of flight hours. Although it was expected that normalizing the mishap rate by the
number of flight hours rather than the number of sorties would yield different results, this
observation is surprisingly similar to that of previous studies [8]. Therefore, it is
probable that SD accidents are more likely to occur in the flight conditions present in the
typical missions of these aircraft. Unfortunately, this analysis did not clearly indicate a
reason for this difference. Many potential reasons for this difference could by
hypothesized, including the likelihood of reduced decision times due to lower altitudes or
faster flight, increased aircraft agility resulting in more aggressive maneuvers, or crew
configuration.
Regarding crew size among fixed-wing aircraft, it was found that single-seat
aircraft incurred SD mishaps at over 4 times the rate of multi-seat aircraft. While this
finding is impressive, it should be tempered by the knowledge that it is basically
demonstrating the same effect of mission type as the fighter/attack trend. Thus, when a
crew size analysis was limited to F/A aircraft only, the single-seat SD mishap rate was
only slightly higher than the multi-seat F/A aircraft mishap rate (3.28 versus 3.15
mishaps per million flight hours). This result does differ from the result provided by
previous analyses of rate per sortie, which indicated that the mishap rate was slightly
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higher for two-seat than single seat F/A aircraft [6]. Overall, and somewhat surprisingly,
the data indicates that the second crew member provides minimal, if any, protection from
Class A mishaps.
The high-speed General Dynamics F-16 has been implicated as being overly
vulnerable to SD [6]. While the F-16 did accrue the largest number of SD mishaps in this
timeframe, normalizing mishaps by flight hours diminished the apparent effect. The
analysis indicated that the F-16 incurred SD mishaps at 1.4 times the rate of all other
fighter/attack aircraft. Since this difference was not statistically significant, it is not clear
that F-16s are more vulnerable to SD than other fighter/attack aircraft.
Perhaps one of the more interesting and difficult to interpret effects was the
likelihood of SD mishaps in night as compared to day conditions. It was expected that
the rate of SD mishaps would be substantially larger at night than during the day as loss
of visibility would be expected to increase the likelihood of SD. However, the ratio of
nighttime to daytime SD-related mishaps was 1.16, indicating that SD-related mishaps
occur with only a modest increase in frequency at night as compared to day. This result
was unexpected as visual cues are greatly reduced at night as compared to day. Also
surprising, when comparing all mishaps, nighttime Class A mishaps are much less likely
to occur than daytime Class A mishaps. The reason for this difference is unclear, but one
possible explanation is that the missions flown at night are significantly less aggressive
than the missions flown during the day and this difference in mission profile is
confounded with the time of day. Since the number of flight hours flown at night and
during the day differs by about 16%, one can compare the ratio of SD-related mishaps to
all Class A mishaps. In this comparison, SD related mishaps account for 26.2 percent of
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all Class A mishaps at night but only 7.2 percent during the day. Therefore, it is possible
that the likelihood of SD accidents at night is much greater than during the day for similar
missions, but the databases do not provide enough detail to test this claim.
Unfortunately the database was not structured to permit the comparison of several
factors of interest, including NVG use. Previous analysis of helicopter mishap reports
found that SD mishaps involving NVGs occurred at nearly 9 times the rate of those
during daytime flight [11]. This same study found accident records which indicated that
62% of spatial disorientation mishaps occurred at night [11]. Quality decrements to the
pilot’s visual input, such as NVG use may also limit the true visibility of the environment
to the pilot. As such, previous literature would indicate that misperceptions and SD may
be much more likely to occur in limited visibility conditions. However, the database was
not structured to reliably permit analysis of NVG use. For similar reasons, it would have
been desirable to understand the effect of weather conditions that reduced operator
visibility on the occurrence of SD-related Class A mishaps. However, this comparison
once again was not facilitated by the database. The authors also sought to understand the
impact of pilot experience level on the likelihood of SD-related Class A mishaps but were
unable to reliably obtain the data necessary to facilitate this comparison from the existing
database. It would be desirable to structure the database to permit these comparisons in
the future.
Overall, this study demonstrated that the normalization of mishap data by flight
hours rather than number of flights can result in different interpretations of the existing
mishap data. Further, this study emphasizes the fact that Spatial Disorientation remains a
significant issue for military aviation, especially for helicopter and fighter/attack aircraft.
21

Tenable explanations are that these aircraft may engage in more aggressive maneuvers,
resulting in an increased incidence of spatial disorientation or that the proximity to earth
and speed of these aircraft shorten pilot decision times, thus increasing the risk of a
mishap as a result of the incidence of spatial disorientation. Perhaps each of these
factors contributes to the increase in mishaps among these aircraft. Regardless of the
reason for the increase in mishap rate, it is clear that future efforts to reduce SD mishaps
should focus on these platforms as SD mishaps are 5 times more likely per flight hour in
these aircraft than other aircraft.
It should be noted that helmet-mounted displays are being considered for
incorporation into many fighter/attack aircraft as this technology is anticipated to increase
the pilot’s situation awareness [12]. While this increase in situation awareness may
potentially reduce SD, the ability of these devices to result in attention blindness or the
potential removal of reference information (e.g., the airframe) may actually have a
detrimental effect on the pilot’s awareness of spatial orientation. Therefore, there is a
need to update the safety system database to capture the use of these devices in addition
to the use of NVGs to permit any effect of these technologies on SD mishaps to be
evaluated in future studies.
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Abstract
Aviation mishaps involving spatial disorientation (SD) have cost the U.S. Air Force over
$2B in the past two decades. A non-traditional attitude display, the attitude stabilization
display (ASD) has been proposed which may alleviate concerns with the current attitude
indicator (AI) and mitigate the risks of spatial disorientation. Participants used both the
proposed and current designs to recover from unusual attitudes in a desktop flight
simulation. Participants completed recovery tasks approximately 2 seconds faster with
the AI, on average. There was a significant difference indicating that participants also
found it easier to learn how to use the AI. There was a significant effect of flight
experience on recovery time difference, with more experienced pilots performing better
with the AI and less experienced pilots performing better with the ASD. Since the
majority of participants already had experience with the AI, these results were expected.
Survey responses revealed that certain ASD design choices could be beneficial in the
cockpit. Since this study did not measure the full intent of the ASD, which is to aid the
pilot during SD inception and avoid SD altogether, further investigation of the ASD is
warranted.

Keywords
Spatial Disorientation, Attitude Indicator, Human Factors, Flight Simulator
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Introduction
Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. When suffering from SD, pilots naturally tend
to make aircraft inputs and controls that may create safe flight in their perceived
orientation, but result in unsafe flight in reality. These inputs often cause the aircraft to
enter unusual attitudes (UAs) which may include unperceived inversions, steep climbs,
and sharp dives. These unusual attitudes brought on by SD thus immensely increase the
risk of a mishap. Across the U.S. Air Force, SD mishaps are both prevalent and costly. In
fact, 72 spatial disorientation (SD) Class A mishaps have occurred in the Air Force since
fiscal year 1993 which resulted in the loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total cost of
$2.32 billion [2].
Pilots often use displays and instruments in the cockpit to determine their
orientation when a view of the outside world is degraded by weather, darkness, or a
perceived visual illusion. Particularly when suffering from SD, pilots are instructed to
focus only on their instruments to discern their aircraft’s attitude. The first
instrumentation to combat SD was an attitude indicator (AI) known as the Sperry
Horizon, originally developed in 1928 by Elmer Sperry Jr. of the Sperry Corporation [3].
Since that time, despite some known human factors and training issues, this attitude
instrument and display has become standard in most instrumented aircraft cockpits [4]
and is generally replicated in electronic form within even the most modern American
aircraft cockpits. However, this instrument may not effectively combat spatial
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disorientation since mishaps involving spatial disorientation continue to occur across all
forms of flight [2].
This research, seeks to understand the performance of a proposed attitude display.
This proposed system is termed an Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD). The ASD
differs in three significant fashions from the Sperry-style AI. First, it draws the pilot’s
attention by way of an auditory alert when it determines that the aircraft is entering an
unexpected attitude, indicating the potential onset of SD. Second, the display employs a
potentially more intuitive graphical interface (explained later) to aid pilots in determining
their attitude. Finally, the ASD provides a specific, recommended course of action to
guide the pilot towards returning the aircraft to the expected attitude once it has detected
the presence of the unexpected attitude. While each of these differences is intended to
improve the Sperry-style AI, this research will focus on only the second intended
improvement, comparing the graphical depiction in the ASD to the traditional AI.
Literature Review
Spatial Disorientation
SD is typically categorized based on the pilot’s response. Specifically, a pilot can
recognize, not recognize, or become incapacitated by SD. Type I, or unrecognized, SD
occurs when pilots do not realize that they are suffering from SD and fly the aircraft in an
unintended attitude. Typically, Type I SD results in either a controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) or a transition to Type II SD. Recognized, or Type II, SD comes into existence
when pilots recognize that they are spatially disoriented. At this stage, Type II SD
typically results in a recovery and regaining of spatial orientation or a transition to Type
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III SD. If pilots are unable to handle the realization that they are suffering from SD and
are thus unable to match their perception of motion, position, and attitude to reality (i.e.
recover), this is classified as Type III SD, or incapacitating, SD [5].
Often, the vestibular system of the inner ear is to blame for SD episodes. The
semicircular canals and otolith organs, which make up the vestibular system, are sensitive
only to acceleration, not to sustained movement. Therefore, after sustaining a constant
turn for approximately 10-15 seconds, an aircraft pilots’ vestibular organs begin to relay
sensory signals which are consistent with straight and level flight, while the aircraft is
continuing to turn [6]. Several other imperfections in the vestibular system can cause
issues in flight. The utricle (one of the two otolith organs), for example, cannot
distinguish between a tilting of the head and a linear acceleration. Therefore, under
sustained forward acceleration, the utricle will provide the same signals to the brain that
it would if the head was tilted backward under no acceleration [6]. Thus, the pilot may
mistakenly perceive forward acceleration of his aircraft as an upward pitch (i.e. a
backward tilt of the body/head/aircraft) and mistakenly pitch the aircraft down while in
straight and level flight.
Auditory Alarms
The auditory alert employed by the ASD was developed in recognition of the fact
that the operational concept behind the Sperry-style AI is flawed. Specifically, its
weakness is that it requires the pilot to periodically focus visual attention on the
instrument to determine if their perception of attitude is correct. However, focusing on
this instrument is a non-intuitive action for pilots because even if type I SD has set in,
they have no reason to believe that their perceived attitude is false. Thus, there is no
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reason to ensure that it is correct. Therefore the traditional AI violates Norman’s design
principle of feedback since pilots have to actively seek feedback from the control
movements that they input instead of feedback being provided to them in a way that is
cognitively simple to perceive [7].
By permitting the pilot to communicate expected flight parameters to the system,
the ASD automatically monitors the attitude of the aircraft and provides auditory alerts to
the pilot whenever the attitude of the aircraft is outside the pilot’s expected flight
parameters. These auditory alerts plausibly allow pilots to spend less time visually
scanning their instruments and more time with their eyes outside of the cockpit, ensuring
that their airspace is clear of hazards. Thus, the non-intuitive check of the traditional AI
to ensure that a pilot is not suffering from SD is alleviated. This change may improve the
pilot’s ability to become aware of spatial disorientation (i.e. transition quickly from type I
to type II SD, or skip type I SD entirely) before it becomes a significant issue.
Aside from the common experiential knowledge that auditory alarms tend to
capture our attention, there is some scholarly work on the subject. A primary advantage
of auditory alarms over visual ones is that when we focus our visual attention, we
typically see one specific item very clearly while our visual perception of non-attended
items suffers. The auditory sense is quite different in that it is not as easily focused. As a
result, we tend to hear certain auditory alerts even when we are not attending to them [8].
Therefore, human factors guidance often recommends that “if there is an alarm signal that
must be sensed…it should be given an auditory form (although redundancy in the visual
or tactile channel may be worthwhile)” [9].
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Unfortunately, this capture of attention can be undesirable. Alarms, which are
intended to immediately induce focus from a pilot, may inadvertently disrupt their
cognitive processing, distract them, and steal their attention from a potentially more
important stimulus [8, 10]. This issue occurs in the cockpit as a result of the everincreasing number of ad-hoc auditory alarms and signals being implemented [11]. It is
therefore possible that while the ASD’s auditory alarm may effectively capture the
attention of pilots suffering from SD, it may also contribute to their confusion during
times where many different auditory alarms may be sounding.
Command Displays
In addition to the auditory alert, the ASD employs a visual command to the pilot
(e.g. “pull up”), which informs him or her of the correct action to initiate return to
straight and level flight. There have been a number of robust research efforts which
compared status displays, which simply provide an alert that something has gone wrong,
and command displays, which additionally provide information about actions that must
be taken. The underlying theory is that decision making is split into three basic steps, “(1)
acquiring and perceiving information or cues relevant for the decision, (2) generating and
selecting hypotheses of situation assessments about what the cues mean,…[and] (3)
planning and selecting choices to take” [9].
It has been hypothesized that command displays, such as the one found in the
ASD significantly reduce or eliminate the time and cognitive effort needed to perform
steps two and three [12]. The claim is that in high stress situations, such as an in-flight
emergency, pilots experience a high temporal and cognitive demand. Therefore, the
automation of this process can aid the pilot in returning his or her aircraft to the desired
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orientation. Recognition-primed decision making could be happening when recovering
from UAs if the pilot in question has been in similar situations [13]. As discussed above,
the cognitive effort required to access long-term memory and compare the current
situation to past experiences can take some time to perform. Command displays attempt
to bypass that time by providing pilots with a decision instead of waiting for them to
make their own.
These hypotheses were empirically tested using pilot response to simulated inflight icing of an aircraft. With the participation of 27 commercial pilots from the
University of Illinois, pilot response time and accuracy to the first indication of icing
when using either a status or command display was measured [12]. Additionally, the
accuracy of information provided was manipulated to determine any effects of pilot trust
or distrust in automation. A lack of reliability of automation can result in the user
distrusting the automation. On the other hand, a very high reliability may cause the user
to become complacent and not check the work of the automation. As a final caveat,
humans are so unpredictable that they may display some form of mistrust, in which their
trust level of the automation is not related to reliability at all [9].
Pilots using the command display trended towards better performance in terms of
response accuracy, though there was no significant effect of display type on response
time. However, the most interesting results were the interactions between display type
and information. Inaccurate information was linked to a much larger performance
decrement in command displays than it was in status displays [12]. The experimenters
appear to have validated their hypothesis that command aids help to eliminate decisionmaking steps for the pilot. The larger performance decrement seems to indicate that pilots
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are more likely to blindly follow the instructions of the command display while
cognitively analyzing the status display before acting. Ostensibly, this blind following
saves vital seconds in response time. Clearly, though, if the wrong instructions are
presented to a blindly obedient pilot, the results may be catastrophic.
Importantly, in the realm of manned aviation, it has been shown that the use of
aural commands may have the capability to dramatically aid the pilot in recovering from
unusual attitudes. In a 2008 experiment, 12 U. S. Air Force fighter pilots were presented
with unusual attitudes in an F-16 flight simulator. Experimental conditions varied the
presence of certain attitude display aids, with the control condition utilizing only a
standard heads-up display (HUD) and other experimental conditions using a command
visual icon, the icon and an auditory command, or the icon and a tactile command. When
pilots were given the auditory command aid, they were approximately 15% faster in
leveling their wings under a moderate inversion (approximately 120° of roll, and varying
pitch angles), and approximately 20% faster when under a severe inversion (approaching
180° of roll, and varying pitch angles). Additionally, pilots input one quarter the number
of incorrect control movements when using the auditory aid than when using the HUD
only. Subjectively, 80% of the pilots who indicated preferring one aid over another
selected the auditory commands as their most preferred aid [14].
Attitude Indicator Graphical Layouts
The ASD’s graphical interface is also a point of interest. First, it employs a
moving-aircraft symbol, stationary horizon (also known as outside-in) construct instead
of the moving-horizon, stationary aircraft (also known as inside-out) construct of the
Sperry-style AI. The selection between these two structures has been hotly debated since
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before the Sperry Horizon was patented. In support of the moving-aircraft displays, the
principle of the moving part is often cited. According to this principle, the best displays
employ movement in a manner that accurately and intuitively represents that movement
in reality. When the principle of the moving part is applied to the aviation domain, “one
might say that when a pilot moves a control, he knows he is controlling his aircraft, not
the outside world relative to his aircraft, and therefore he expects his aircraft symbols to
move” [4]. Thus, this principle theoretically favors a moving-aircraft AI.
Interestingly, the argument is not entirely theoretical. There is a substantial body
of research which indicates that inexperienced pilots learn to use the moving-aircraft
display more quickly and that experienced pilots quickly achieve higher levels of
performance when transitioning to the moving-aircraft display. In fact, in 1960, Donald
Bauerschmidt and Stanley Roscoe simulated an air-to-air attack task and compared pilot
performance on the two display types. Average steering errors calculated at the end of the
task with the moving-aircraft display were approximately one fifth the size of those
calculated with the moving-horizon display. Additionally, the pilots made approximately
18 times the number of control reversals when using the moving-horizon display as they
did when using the moving-aircraft display. Perhaps the most intriguing discussion point
is that all of these results were found despite the fact that all participants’ flight
experience had included the traditional moving-horizon display [15].
The debate is not one-sided, however, and there are many advocates of the
moving-horizon AI. Nearly all of them discredit the results of any experiment performed
on the ground because the utility of the moving-horizon display, they claim, is only
achieved in actual flight [16]. The validity of ground-based results can certainly be called
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into question when researching a realm where airborne accelerations and the vestibular
cues that they provide will no doubt influence the pilots’ perception of their orientation.
In support of this, many cite Col. James Doolittle, who influenced the design of the
Sperry Horizon. Doolittle claimed that the pilot and the aircraft function as one, and the
pilot’s main frame of reference is indeed the aircraft [16]. This concept can be
corroborated nearly verbatim in modern literature [6]. With this in mind, Doolittle
claimed that since the real aircraft never moves with respect to the pilot, it makes no
sense that the display’s aircraft symbol should move with respect to the pilot and thus
requested that the Sperry Horizon employ a moving-horizon, stationary-aircraft construct
[16].
Putting the debate to the test, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took to
the sky with each of 32 FAA-certified male pilots, a Beech T-34 military trainer, and a
safety pilot. They performed an airborne experiment which compared the two types of
displays in their ability to aid the pilot in recovering from UAs. In terms of bank angle
recovery, pitch angle recovery, and number of control reversals, there were no overall
trends that indicated either the moving-aircraft or moving-horizon indicator was superior.
In general, it appeared that low-experience pilots tended towards better performance with
the moving-aircraft AI while high-experience pilots tended towards better performance
with the moving-horizon display. This effect held true when measuring the number of
control reversals, with both groups performing at about the same level when using the
moving-aircraft AI [16].
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Literature Summary
Based on this literature review, the ASD may offer a significant benefit in terms
of enabling recovery from and/or preventing SD. First, it appears that command displays,
such as those utilized in the ASD, in comparison to status displays utilized in traditional
AIs, may decrease the time necessary for pilots to recover from UAs. Additionally, it is
widely held that auditory alerts such as those employed by the ASD, are more effective at
capturing attention than are visual signifiers such as those passively displayed by a
traditional AI. Finally, the ASD’s moving-aircraft display, when compared to a
traditional moving-horizon AI, has the potential to be effective in decreasing the time
needed to respond to UAs and in decreasing the number of control reversals during
recovery from them. Thus, the ASD merits further investigation and analysis.
While the combination of the ASD’s attributes is interesting, the current research
was focused to understand the effect of the graphical depiction of aircraft attitude in the
ASD as compared to the traditional AI. This limitation was due to unforeseen issues with
auditory command lagging and the unavailability of a moving-based simulator. However,
it is likely that the other attributes of the ASD, either singly or in combination will have
benefit beyond those investigated within the current experiment. Additionally, this study
is intended to contribute to the general body of knowledge of AIs. Thus, through data
analysis and a survey process, this study will unfold the utility of certain differences
between the AI and the ASD. In so doing, the goal is to determine why various aspects of
the ASD may or may not be beneficial to pilots.
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Method
Overview
A desktop computer based, non-moving flight simulator was used to compare the
graphical depiction of the ASD to the traditional AI. Participants were selected from all
flight experience levels and were asked to recover from already in-progress unusual
attitudes in the flight simulation. Metrics such as the number of control errors, the time to
complete recovery, and the root mean square error from perfect recovery were collected.
Participants
Participants were 28 male Wright-Patterson Air Force Base personnel, ranging in
age from 21 to 65 with a mean of 30. Previous flight experience ranged from 0 to 5000
flight hours with a mean of 600 hours, and 0 to 2000 unmanned flight hours (including
flight simulator, remotely piloted aircraft, and radio control aircraft) with a mean of 263
hours. Of the 28 participants, 6 were instrument-rated pilots, 8 had experienced SD in
flight, and 9 had undergone SD training. For the purpose of data analysis, participants
were categorized based on their flight experience levels. There were 5 “experienced”
pilots who had over 1000 hours of flight time, 9 “unmanned only” pilots who had no
manned flight time, and 5 “total novice” participants who had no manned or unmanned
flight experience. These were three separate binary categories with all 28 participants
being categorized three times as either a member or non-member of each category.
Apparatus
Flight simulation took place on a Hewlett-Packard Z820 workstation running Xplane 10 Professional on a 30” Samsung Syncmaster 305T monitor. Manipulation of the
simulated aircraft was accomplished with a Saitek X-52 joystick and throttle
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combination. The software simulated an F-22 Raptor flying at 450 knots at 20,000 feet
above ground level.
The ASD is shown in Figure 1, depicting a descending left turn. To interpret the
display, participants were instructed to concern themselves only with pitch and bank. To
determine their pitch, participants used the vertical scale in the center of the display. The
green upside-down “V” symbol represented the nose of their aircraft and the thick white
bar represented the horizon. Thus, when the “V” was above the white bar, they were
pitched up and vice versa. To determine their bank, participants used the rounded scale
occupying the uppermost portion of the display. The white aircraft symbol represented
their aircraft. When this symbol was at the top of the rounded scale, the aircraft was
straight and level. As participants banked left, the symbol would slide along the scale to
the left, and vice versa.

Figure 1(III). ASD Depicting a Descending Left Turn
The AI is shown in Figure 2, depicting the same descending left turn. To interpret
the display, participants were instructed to concern themselves only with pitch and bank.
To determine their pitch, participants used the vertical scale in the center of the display.
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The black upside-down “V” symbol represented the nose of their aircraft and the thin
white bar which separates the blue and brown areas represented the horizon. The blue
area represented the sky and the brown area represented the ground. Thus, when the “V”
was above the white bar, the simulated aircraft was pitched up and vice versa. To
determine their bank, participants either referenced the horizon bar to ensure that it was
completely horizontal, or used the rounded scale occupying the uppermost portion of the
display. The white arrow on this scale always points directly towards the sky. When this
arrow was at the top of the rounded scale, the aircraft was straight and level. As
participants banked left, the symbol would slide along the scale to the right, as shown in
Figure 2, and vice versa.

Figure 2(III). AI Depicting a Descending Left Turn
Procedure
After giving informed consent and completing a demographic survey, participants
read an instruction document which explained the tasks they were to perform. The two
displays (AI and ASD) were explained in detail to the participant and any necessary
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clarifications were made. Participants were given instruction on how to best interpret the
two displays, but not on specific recovery techniques. The participant was then free to fly
the simulator with the first display (one of two within-subjects conditions) for up to ten
minutes. This free-fly session was used to familiarize the participants with the controls,
the display, and the behavior of the simulated aircraft. Next, two practice trials were
performed to familiarize participants with the task. In each trial, participants were placed
in an already in-flight situation. In each situation, the simulated aircraft was started in one
of six unusual pitch/bank attitudes. These attitudes included three levels of bank
(moderate bank of 45°, moderate inversion of 120°, and severe inversion of 165°) and
two levels of pitch (moderate pitch 30°, and severe pitch of 60°). A list of the individual
starting orientations can be found in Appendix E.
Participants had no visual reference except for the display being used, which
occupied a 3” by 3” square on the otherwise black screen. This was intended to simulate
a pilot who was experiencing SD and, in accordance with his training, was focusing
solely on his instruments to regain his perception of orientation. Participants began each
trial looking at an entirely black screen, with their hand neutral on the joystick. On the
experimenter’s command “ready, go!”, the simulation was unpaused, the first display
being used appeared on the screen, and the participant began the task of returning the
aircraft to straight and level flight (+/- 5° of pitch, +/- 10° of bank). Once the simulated
aircraft stayed within these parameters for at least 2 seconds, the trial was terminated.
After two practice trials and six experimental trials, the second display was explained in
detail and the entire process was repeated.
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Experimental Design
Demographics collected via survey were age, gender, manned and unmanned
flight hours logged, previous instrument ratings, previous experience of SD in flight, and
previous SD training. The only independent variables which were manipulated were the
display being used, and the order of displays used within-subjects. The order of displays
used was alternated between participants to avoid any practice effect which might
increase performance on the second display used. However, it is acknowledged that the
trained pilots had significant experience and training using the traditional AI, training
beyond that received by any participant using the ASD. The counterbalancing of order
was also performed to minimize the perception that the ASD was “new and/or improved”
while the AI was “old technology”.
The order of situations was counterbalanced to minimize any learning effect from
one display to the next. With the first display, participants went through situations 1-6 in
numerical order. With the second display, situations 2 and 3 were swapped with
situations 5 and 6. This difference in order was applied to reduce the likelihood that
participants would predict the next situation based on the experience they had with the
first display. This particular arrangement was chosen because it did not alter the order of
severity of banks/pitches and thus allowed analysis to be performed regarding each
display’s performance in varying unusual attitude severities.
Dependent variables included time to complete recovery, RMS error of recovery,
and initial control error count. After the end of an experimental session, the data was
analyzed in Microsoft Excel to calculate these variables. The program used in Excel
allowed the experimenter to see the elapsed time of the simulation at a precision of one
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tenth of a second, the simulated aircraft’s pitch and bank at a precision of one hundredth
of a degree, as well as the participant’s joystick inputs at a precision of one hundredth of
a percent. To determine time to recovery, the experimenter found the first instance that
the aircraft’s pitch and bank was within the acceptable tolerances for straight and level
flight (+/- 5° of pitch, +/- 10° of bank) for at least two seconds. The beginning of this two
second portion was recorded as the recovery time. To tally initial control errors, the
experimenter determined whether the participant made the initial joystick input in the
correct direction of bank (i.e. a left input for right banks and vice versa). An initial
control error was recorded when the participant made a control input of 10% or more in
the incorrect direction for any length of time or a control input of 5% or more in the
incorrect direction for at least two tenths of a second. These criteria were adopted to
prevent misclassification of any unintended stick movements.
A post-experimental survey was used to elicit participant’s subjective thoughts
towards each display and is shown in Appendix C. These included preference of one
display over the other, the perceived best and worst aspects of each display, the ease of
learning how to use each display (with a 5-point rating scale), the strategies used, whether
either display was misinterpreted during the trials, and any recommended improvements.
The goal of these survey items was to provide some background for effects seen in the
experimental data. For instance, if participants communicated that one display was more
preferred and easier to use, there would be an expectation that performance in the
experiment would be superior with this display. Also, if one display performed poorly,
survey responses indicating frequent misinterpretations and complicated strategy for
using this display may explain the poor performance.
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Data Cleaning
It was noted that in the unusual attitudes that included an upwards pitch, there was
a large difference in recovery technique between experienced and novice participants.
Novice pilots tended to push the stick forward to bring the nose of the aircraft to the
horizon. Experienced pilots avoided this technique as it would incur negative Gz forces,
which would cause the pilot to rise out of the seat and press against the seatbelts,
potentially reducing the pilots’ ability to control the aircraft. Because of this varying
technique, recovery times and RMS values differed greatly for reasons that had nothing
to do with the effect of the display. Thus, all upward pitched situations were excluded
from data analysis. Additionally, one participant lost control of the aircraft during several
recoveries and was excluded as an outlier.
Results
Preference
In terms of preference of one display over the other, approximately 26% (7) of the
participants preferred the ASD over the traditional AI. Although this is a relatively low
proportion, it is an impressive finding since nearly all of the participants had some level
of prior experience with the AI, none of them had experience with the ASD, and
participants were instructed to select the display they would fly a real aircraft with if they
had the option. In fact the most experienced participant to prefer the ASD had 850 actual
flight hours with the AI. However, as previous flight experience increased, preference for
ASD generally decreased, as expected. In fact, 81.8% of those who had manned or
unmanned flight experience preferred the AI, as shown in Table 1. Thus, the odds of

43

preferring the AI were 6.75 times higher for those with some experience than for those
with none. However this effect only neared statistical significance (χ2(1, 27) = 3.710,
p=0.0541).
Table 1(III). Contingency Table of ASD Preference by Novice Status

Non-Novice
Novice
Total

AI Preferred
18
2
20

ASD Preferred
4
3
7

Total
22
5
27

Ease of Learning
Participants used a 5-point rating scale to indicate how easy it was to quickly
become confident using the ASD, the majority of participants (10) chose “easy”. The
majority of participants (17) chose “very easy” in response to the same question with the
AI. When coded numerically with -2 representing “very easy” and +2 representing “very
hard”, the ASD mean response was -0.48 and the AI mean response was -1.41. The
average difference in responses was therefore 0.93 lower (i.e. easier) for the AI. A
Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that the AI (Mdn = -2) was rated as easier to learn
than the ASD (Mdn = -1), z = 2.19, p = 0.0285, r = -0.287. This rating difference ranged
from 4 higher (i.e. harder) with the ASD to 3 higher with the AI. All of these results were
expected since the majority of participants had already learned how to use the AI but
were unfamiliar with the ASD. With these facts in mind, it is noteworthy that more than
one third of the participants found the ASD at least as easy to learn as the AI, and 20%
found it easier to learn than the AI.
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Time to Recovery
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the starting
orientation had a significant main effect on the time to recovery, F(2, 25) = 15.09, p <
0.0001. This was an expected main effect since the more drastic unusual attitudes started
participants far from straight and level flight and required longer duration control inputs
to recover than the less extreme starting attitudes. Display type also had a significant
main effect on time to recovery, F(1,25) = 15.03, p = 0.0007. Participants averaged 7.89
seconds to recover the aircraft using the ASD and 5.97 seconds using the AI, as shown in
Figure 3. The average time difference was therefore 1.92 seconds faster with the AI. As
expected, there was a significant interaction between the presence of flight experience
and display type, F(1, 25) = 10.41, p = 0.0035. Because of their previous use of the AI,
participants with flight experience completed the recovery task an average of 2.78
seconds faster with the AI than with the ASD, while participants with no flight
experience were an average of 0.22 seconds faster with the AI that with the ASD.
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Figure 3(III). Bar Graph of Flight Experience and Display Type Interaction Effect on
Time to Recover
Root Mean Square Error
The root mean square (RMS) error from 0° of pitch and bank was calculated for
each recovery, with lower values indicating a more accurate (i.e. less deviation from
perfect) recovery. An ANOVA showed that the starting orientation of the simulated
aircraft had a significant main effect on RMS error, F(2, 25) = 126.84, p < 0.0001. This
finding was expected since the RMS values were dependent on deviations from 0° of
pitch and bank. Thus, the more severe unusual attitudes necessitated higher RMS values
regardless of recovery time or accuracy. Flight experience levels had no statistically
significant effect on RMS error. Participants averaged 72.27 degree*seconds with the
ASD and 69.20 degree*seconds with the AI. The average RMS difference was therefore
3.07 lower with the AI. However, there was no statistically significant effect of display
type on RMS error.
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Initial Control Error Count
It was postulated that one of the two display symbologies might allow pilots to
more accurately determine their orientation at a glance, and therefore produce fewer
errors in the initial recovery process. Thus, the number of initial bank errors was
calculated for each participant. In other words, if the participant should have banked left
to achieve the quickest recovery but banked right instead, this was coded as an initial
control error. An ANOVA reported that there was a significant three-way interaction
effect between display type, order of displays used, and starting orientation, F(2, 50) =
4.49, p = 0.0161. This interaction can be seen in the large differences between Figures 4
and 5. A potential explanation for this effect lies in the counterbalancing scheme used for
the starting orientations. One of the two orders had participants engaged in a severe
inversion before the less severe orientations, while the other increased in severity with
each trial. Since the majority of participants had been previously exposed to the AI, any
learning effect present would have been more drastic when the ASD was being used. It is
likely that those who both used the AI first and had the building severity situations had
the maximum amount of time to learn how to best interpret the ASD and complete the
tasks. Those who either used the ASD first or had the initially severe situations had less
time to learn before being tested by the severe inversion and thus committed more errors.
A description of all the situations and their associated numbers and orders can be found
in Appendix E. Interestingly, none of the two-way interactions involving these variables
were statistically significant. Participants averaged 0.26 errors per trial with the ASD and
0.48 errors per trial with the AI. The average error count difference was therefore 0.22
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more errors per trial with the AI. However, display type did not have a significant effect
on the number of errors made.
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Figure 4(III). Bar Graph of Situation Number and Display Type when ASD was the First
Display
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Figure 5(III). Bar Graph of Situation Number and Display Type when AI was the First
Display
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Open-Ended Survey Items
With the aim of generalizing this study beyond a single piece of technology,
several survey items asked participants to share their qualitative thoughts on the two
displays. These responses, both from novice participants and more experienced pilots,
were intended to elucidate general attitude display characteristics or features which may
be favorable to a pilot. It is important to note that many of these responses simply suggest
incorporating some aspects of the AI into the ASD. This bias toward AI features is likely
due to many participants having previous experience with the AI. Since total novices had
no prior experience, their responses were noted below. Only those recommendations
which were mentioned by at least three participants are included.
Recommended ASD Improvements
One survey item asked participants to recommend improvements to the ASD. Ten
of the 28 participants (including four of the six total novices) recommended that the ASD
distinguish upward and downward pitch using a color scheme such as the AI’s blue sky
and brown ground concept. One of these participants additionally noted that color
distinction is not the only available method. This participant suggested angling pitch bars
away from the horizon so that pilots would understand their direction of pitch based on
the angle of the bars. Four participants (zero novices) suggested that the ASD’s zeropitch bar be extended across the display to form a horizon line. They did not recommend
a moving-horizon display, but simply a longer line. Three participants (including one
novice) believed that the ASD was too cluttered and advised that it be simplified. Three
participants (zero novices) did not want to look at two separate pieces of the display to
determine their pitch and bank. They believed that pilots should be able to determine both
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pieces of information in a single glance at the display. Ostensibly, this would decrease the
necessary visual search and fixation time and cognitive effort necessary to comprehend
the display.
ASD Best Features
Participants were asked to list what they viewed as the best features of the ASD.
Fourteen of the 28 participants listed the visual commands (including three of the six total
novices) as being helpful in quickly comprehending the correct control input. Five
participants (including one novice) found the tail-view bank symbol at the top of the ASD
to be intuitive in determining bank direction. Five more participants (including one
novice) were partial to the bank indicator wedge for quickly comprehending bank
direction. Four participants (zero novices) cited the use of different colors to
communicate urgency to the pilot as being beneficial in commanding attention. Finally,
three participants (including one novice) listed the ASD’s stationary background as being
superior to the AI’s motion.
AI Best Features
Participants were also asked to list what they viewed as the best features of the
AI. Fifteen of the 28 participants (including four of the six total novices) cited the use of
color to distinguish pitch direction (blue sky and brown ground) as a beneficial AI
feature. Nine participants (including four novices) found the simplicity of the AI to be its
best attribute. Five participants (including one novice) appreciated the horizon line used
to represent zero pitch in the AI. Three participants (including one novice) noted that the
AI’s “sky-pointer” arrow helped them determine their orientation. Finally, in support of
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the aforementioned bias towards features from the AI, four participants (zero novices)
admitted that their familiarity with the AI was the aspect they found most appealing.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study was designed to determine if the graphical representation provided by
the AI or ASD more intuitively communicated orientation in 3-D space to the pilot. The
goal was to see if a pilot who was attending to his instruments would be able to more
quickly and accurately return to straight and level flight with one of these two displays. It
was found that participants recovered about 2 seconds faster with the traditional AI than
with the ASD, on average. Participants also rated the AI as significantly easier to learn
than the ASD. However, it should be noted that nearly all of the participants came into
this study already having at least some experience with the AI and thus would be
expected to perform better with it. With that in mind, it is interesting to see the effect of
number of flight hours on recovery times. More experienced participants tended to
perform better with the AI while less experienced participants tended to perform better
with the ASD. Manned flight experience accounted for over 30% of the variation in
recovery times.
While RMS error and initial error count comparisons yielded non-significant
results, participants had lower RMS values with the AI yet higher error counts with the
AI. The lower number of errors seen in the ASD may be due, in part, to its use of a visual
command display. The ASD textually displayed the correct initial control action to the
participants, while the AI left it up to the participants to decide on their own. While there
are inherent drawbacks to the use or non-use of these commands, they may well be the
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reason for the fewer ASD errors. Performance aside, over 25% of participants preferred
the ASD over the AI. This is an interesting fact considering the lack of experience with
the ASD at the outset of the study.
Open-ended survey responses yielded results with potential for generalization to
other attitude displays. The main theme behind the responses was that quick and accurate
comprehension was the single most important factor to the displays perceived
effectiveness. Participants noted that the use of colors, words, and symbols can all be
used in various manners to achieve this speed and accuracy. For example, the AI used
blue and brown colors to distinguish current pitch direction, while the ASD used textual
messages to communicate the correct control input. When deciding how to combine this
possibilities effectively, it is important to remember that simplicity was mentioned many
times as a key aspect to display design. While rich information can be helpful during
times of low workload, designers should temper the urge to provide extra informational
stimuli with the knowledge that pilots may be viewing these displays in less than ideal
circumstances, such as when suffering from SD.
It should be noted that the main advantage of the ASD may not be in unusual
attitude recovery. The intent behind the ASD design is to aid the pilot by alerting the pilot
and drawing his or her attention to the instruments in certain SD-inducing situations. That
being said, eliminating SD entirely is a difficult task which may not be possible for a
single instrument. Therefore, it is important that the symbology and alerting systems be
laid out in a way that allows for quick and accurate recovery from unusual attitudes. To
further test the claim that the ASD may eliminate or minimize the actual occurrence of
SD, future research should be performed in a high-fidelity simulator. If a moving-base
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simulator was used, the vestibular and visual inputs which cause or increase the
likelihood of SD could be portrayed. This could allow the pilot’s actions and performance
to be tracked with each display during the possible inception of SD and the researcher
could see if one display caused pilots to be disoriented while the other did not.
Since fiscal year 1993, there have been 72 SD Class A mishaps in the Air Force
which have claimed 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total cost of $2.32 billion [2]. It has
been hypothesized that the current technology may be one of the many factors
contributing to this deadly trend. This study set out to determine whether the newly
proposed ASD permits the pilot to return their aircraft to level flight more easily and
efficiently than the traditional AI. Ultimately, the AI had faster recovery times and lower
RMS error values. However, it is important to note that fewer initial control errors were
made with the ASD. Additionally, experienced pilots in this study believed the ASD has
potential in the field of SD minimization and mitigation. Several of these went so far as
to say that they would prefer to fly with the ASD despite their years of experience with
the AI. Additionally, over half of the participants used the ASD’s visual commands in
their recovery strategies and found them to be helpful. With the huge costs of SD to the
Air Force, in terms of dollars, aircraft, and lives, the ASD merits further investigation as
a potential path to a safer future.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Pilot Disorientation
Prevention Technologies, especially Mr. Jerry Marstall. The authors would like to

53

further acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Henry Williams and Mr. Charles Powell of the
Naval Aeromedical Research Unit-Dayton.

54

References
1. Barnum, F., and Bonner, R., 1971, “Epidemiology of USAF spatial disorientation
aircraft accidents, 1 Jan 1958–31 Dec 1968,” Aerospace Medicine, 42, 896–898.
2. Poisson, R., and Miller, M., in review, “Air Force Spatial Disorientation Mishap
Trends 1993-2013,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine.
3. Bassett, P.R., and Sperry Jr. E.A., 1934, “Flight Indicator,” United States Patent
1,982,851.
4. Roscoe, S. N., 1968, “Airborne displays for flight and navigation,” Human Factors,
10(4), 321-332.
5. Davis, J.R., Johnson,R., Stepanek, J., and Fogarty, J. A. (Eds.), 2008, “Spatial
orientation in flight,” Fundamentals of Aerospace Medicine (4th Ed.), Lippincott
Williams and Wilkins, 6, 142-197.
6. Rainford, D. and Gradwell, D. (Eds.), 2006, “Spatial orientation in flight,” Ernsting’s
Aviation Medicine (4th Ed.), London, UK: Hodder Arnold, 293-306.
7. Norman, D.A., 1988, “The principle of feedback,” The Psychology of Everyday
Things, New York, NY: Basic Books Inc, 1, 27-29.
8. Banbury, S.P., Macken, W.J., Tremblay, S., and Jones, D.M., 2001, “Auditory
distraction and a short-term memory: phenomena and practical implications,” Human
Factors, 43(1), 12-29.
9. Wickens, C.D., Lee, J.D., Liu, Y., and Gordon Becker, S.E., 2004, An Introduction to
Human Factors Engineering, (2nd Ed.), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
10. Stanton, N.A., Booth, R.T., and Stammers, R.B., 1992, “Alarms in human
supervisory control: a human factors perspective,” International Journal of Computer
Integrated Manufacturing, 5(2), 81-93.
11. Dismukes, R.K., Berman, B.A., and Loukopoulos, L.D., 2007, The Limits of
Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents, Bodmin,
Cornwall, GB: MPG Books Ltd.
12. Sarter, N., and Schroeder, B., 2001, “Supporting decision making and action selection
under time pressure and uncertainty: The case of in-flight icing,” Human Factors, 43(4),
573-583
13. Klein, G.A., 1993, “A recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of rapid decision
making,” Decision making in action: Models and methods, 5(4), 138-147.
55

14. Wickens, C.D., Small, R.L., Andre, T., Bagnall, T., and Brenaman, C., 2008,
“Multisensory enhancement of command displays for unusual attitude recovery,” The
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 18(3), 255-267.
15. Bauerschmidt, D.K., and Roscoe, S.N. 1960, “A comparative evaluation of a pursuit
moving-airplane steering display,” IRE Trans, Human Factors in Electronics, HFE-1(2),
62-66.
16. Hasbrook, A.H., and Rasmussen, P.G., 1973, “In-flight performance of civilian pilots
using moving-aircraft and moving-horizon attitude indicators,” Office of Aviation
Medicine, Federal Aviation Administration.

56

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter will draw general conclusions which merge the two scholarly
articles, describe the significance of their findings, recommend actions that can be taken
as a result of this research, and discuss future research that should be done to build upon
this manuscript.
Conclusions of Research
In chapter II, it was determined that while SD-related mishaps accounted for a
relatively small number of the Class A mishaps, SD-related mishaps are often
catastrophic, being much more likely to result in loss of life, loss of aircraft, and larger
than average monetary losses than the other Class A mishaps. SD-related mishaps
accounted for 12% of the Class A mishaps but accounted for more than 34% of the fatal
mishaps, 25% of the lost lives, 17% of the lost aircraft and 17% of the monetary losses
from Class A mishaps. Overall, this study demonstrated that the normalization of mishap
data by flight hours rather than number of flights can result in different interpretations of
the existing mishap data. Further, this study emphasizes the fact that SD remains a
significant issue for military aviation, especially for helicopter and fighter/attack aircraft.
Perhaps surprisingly, this finding applies equally regardless of whether the fighter/attack
aircraft includes a single crew member or a pair of crew members.
Chapter III analyzed the proposed ASD as a display intended to mitigate or avoid
the effects of SD. This display differed from the traditional AI through a new graphical
depiction of attitude, auditory cues which alert the pilot to incipient SD, and visual
57

commands which instruct the pilot in recovery to level flight. According to the current
literature which was summarized in chapter III, it appears that command displays such as
those utilized in the ASD, in comparison to status displays utilized in traditional AIs, may
decrease the cognitive workload and time necessary for pilots to recover from UAs.
Additionally, it is widely held that auditory alerts such as those employed by the ASD,
are more effective at capturing attention than are visual signifiers such as those passively
displayed by a traditional AI. Finally, the ASD’s moving-aircraft display has the potential
to be effective in decreasing the time needed to respond to UAs and in decreasing the
number of control reversals during recovery for novices. Thus, the ASD merits further
investigation and analysis.
While the combination of the ASD’s attributes is interesting, the current research
was focused to understand the effect of the graphical depiction of aircraft attitude in the
ASD as compared to the traditional AI. This limitation was due to unforeseen issues with
auditory command lagging, the unavailability of a moving-based simulator, and the lack
of willing participants who had no prior knowledge of the AI. However, it is likely that
the other attributes of the ASD, either singly or in combination will have benefit beyond
those investigated within the current experiment. Additionally, this study was intended to
contribute to the general body of knowledge of AIs. Thus, through data analysis and a
survey process, this study attempted to unfold the utility of certain differences between
the AI and the ASD. In so doing, the goal was to determine why various aspects of the
ASD may or may not be beneficial to pilots.
In chapter III, it was found that the AI ultimately had faster recovery times and
lower RMS error values across the entire pool of participants. However, it is important to
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note that fewer initial control errors were made with the ASD. Participants also rated the
AI as significantly easier to learn than the ASD. However, it should be noted that nearly
all of the participants came into this study already having at least some experience with
the AI and thus would be expected to perform better with it. With that in mind, it is
interesting to see the effect of number of flight hours on recovery times. More
experienced participants tended to perform better with the AI while less experienced
participants tended to perform better with the ASD. Finally, experienced pilots in this
study saw ASD as having potential in the field of SD minimization and mitigation and
over half of the participants stated that they used the ASD’s visual commands in their
recovery strategies and found them to be helpful. Two of these went so far as to say that
they would prefer to fly with the ASD despite their years of experience with the AI.
Significance of Research
SD has posed a significant problem to the AF since the advent of aviation and
continues to do so today. SD mishaps have cost the AF more than 2 billion dollars and
more than 100 lives over the past two decades. In addition to being extremely expensive,
SD is poorly understood and often fatal. This thesis research hoped to make strides in
achieving better comprehension of SD by determining which conditions have been highly
correlated with SD occurrence. As a result of the findings in chapter II, it is now apparent
that helicopter and fighter/attack platforms tend to be more prone to SD mishaps.
Furthermore, this research aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge of attitude
displays which may inhibit or mitigate the effects of SD. As a result of the findings in
chapter III, it was shown that the current graphical depiction of the AI may facilitate fast
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recovery, but also allow more initial control errors to occur than an alternate graphical
depiction. Using the knowledge gained through this research, and from future stimulated
research, aviation communities worldwide could benefit by the added knowledge
presented in this document.
Recommendations for Action
It is clear that future efforts to reduce SD mishaps should focus on helicopters and
fighter/attack aircraft as SD mishaps are 5 times more likely per flight hour in these
platforms than in others. Furthermore, there is a need to update the AFSAS database to
capture the use of NVGs in addition to the use of soon to be implemented devices
including HMDs. This would allow any effect of these technologies on SD mishaps to be
evaluated in future studies.
Recommendations for Future Research
To further test the claim that the ASD may eliminate or minimize the actual
occurrence of SD, future research should be performed in a high-fidelity simulator. If a
moving-base simulator was used, the vestibular and visual inputs which cause or increase
the likelihood of SD could be portrayed. This could allow the pilot’s actions and
performance to be tracked with each display during the possible inception of SD and the
researcher could see if one display caused pilots to be disoriented while the other did not.
Additionally, a similar experiment to the one detailed in chapter III should be
performed using only truly novice participants who have had no previous interaction with
the AI. A larger sample, using only these participants, would allow more robust claims to
be made with regard to the ASD and AI comparison. This experiment, or combination of
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experiments, should also seek to test the other aspects of the ASD which may inhibit or
mitigate the effects of SD. For example, participants could perform some distraction task
while their simulated aircraft is supposed to be flying straight and level. During this time,
the simulation could be made to cause deviations from straight and level flight which
would trigger the ASD’s auditory alert/command and draw the participant’s attention to
the display. This scenario would aid in testing the ASD’s true intended utility in avoiding
incipient SD altogether.
Summary
It has long been known that SD is a dangerous situation in flight which can cause
mishaps and that aircraft are outfitted with certain technology used to prevent and recover
from SD. This thesis research revealed just how costly, destructive, and fatal SD has been
over the past two decades and attempted to further the cause of SD avoidance and
mitigation by evaluating a proposed non-traditional display. It is hoped that this work will
give rise to invigorated discussion and research with regard to SD and that the
conclusions drawn in this manuscript and in future works will save dollars, aircraft, and
lives.
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Appendix A: Sample Participant Instruction Sheet
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator
Instructions
1. Thank you for choosing to participate in this study, your participation should take no
longer than one hour. In this study, we are attempting to compare two aircraft attitude
displays using a flight simulator. These are shown below, each depicting a descending
left turn.

2. You will be given the opportunity to “free fly” the simulator for up to 10 minutes with
the aircraft that will be used in the experimental trials. You are free to ask any questions
about the two systems, the aircraft, or the simulation during the “free fly” period or
during the practice trials.

Next, we will begin with two practice trials and six experimental trials with each display. In each
of these trials, you will be presented with an already in-progress, in-flight situation. In every
situation, you will be flying a simulated F-22 Raptor at approximately 20,000 feet above ground
level, at approximately 350 knots indicated airspeed (400mph). The only thing that will change
with each situation is your aircraft’s attitude in space (i.e. its pitch and roll). Before each trial, the
screen will be blank and I will say “ready, Go!”, after hearing this your task is to recover the
aircraft to straight and level flight as quickly as possible and maintain straight and level flight for
at least two seconds. Straight and level flight is defined as 0° of pitch (+/- 5°), and 0° of roll (+/10°). The trial will end if this attitude is maintained for at least 2 seconds, if the aircraft crashes,
or if 60 seconds elapse. The throttle will be set at ½ throttle and you should not need to adjust it.
There is no rudder control or trim.

62

Appendix B: Demographic Survey
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator
Demographic Survey
Participant #:
Age:
Gender:
Total approximate flight time logged (hours):

Total approximate unmanned flight time logged (Radio Control, RPA, or simulator):

Have you ever been an instrument rated pilot? Please describe your instrument rating.

Do you have any history of visual or vestibular abnormalities (i.e. problems with vision or
balance)?
Please explain.

Have you undergone any sort of spatial disorientation training or studied spatial disorientation?
Please describe what the training/studying was like, including who it was provided by and its
duration.

Have you ever experienced spatial disorientation in flight?
Please describe any experiences you have had, including both acute one-time occurrences and
chronic every-flight occurrences.
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Appendix C: Post-Experimental Survey
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircaft Attitude Indicator
Learnability/Preference Survey
Participant #:
Which display did you prefer? (circle one)

What are the best aspects of the display on the left? (most helpful, useful, appealing, etc.)

What are the best aspects of the display on the right? (most helpful, useful, appealing, etc.)

How easy was it for you to quickly feel confident using the display on the right? Mark the scale
below with an X.
-2

-1

0

1

2

Very
Easy

Easy

Neither Easy
Nor Hard

Hard

Very
Hard

Comments:
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How easy was it for you to quickly feel confident using the display on the left? Mark the scale
below with an X.

Comments:

Did you utilize the visual commands (i.e. “bank left”) with the display on the right?
If so, how helpful were they? Mark the scale below with an X

Very
Harmful

Harmful

Neither Helpful
Nor Harmful

Comments:

Did you ever misinterpret the display on the left? If yes, how so?.
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Helpful

Very
Helpful

Did you ever misinterpret the display on the right? If yes, how so?

What was your strategy in completing the tasks with the display on the left? How did this differ
from your strategy with the display on the right?

How could the display on the right be improved?
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Appendix D: Informed Consent Document
Informed Consent Document
For
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator
AFIT/ENV

Principal Investigator:

Dr. Michael Miller, (937) 255-3636 ext. 4651, AFIT/ENV
Michael.Miller@afit.edu

Associate Investigators:

2Lt Robert Poisson, (508) 212-5902, AFIT/ENV
Robert.Poisson@afit.edu

1. Nature and purpose: You have been offered the opportunity to participate in the
“Evaluation of a Multi-Sensory, Moving-Aircraft, Customizable Attitude Indicator” research
study. Your participation will occur at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Building 640,
Room 340.
The purpose of this research is to evaluate a proposed aircraft attitude indicator, termed the
Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) The time requirement for each volunteer subject is
anticipated to be a total of 1 visit of approximately 1 hour. A total of approximately 30
subjects will be enrolled in this study.
2. Experimental procedures: If you decide to participate, the procedures you will be using are
detailed in the “Instructions” document.
3. Discomfort and risks: Discomforts may consist of any discomfort normally associated with
sitting at a computer for an hour such as back aches or fatigued eyes. Additional discomfort
may include those associated with using a stationary desktop flight simulator such as
dizziness or nausea. Potential risks include is the disclosure of individual responses or private
information, which will be mitigated by maintaining anonymous surveys and collecting them
in unsupervised, yet secure, receptacles located in AFIT laboratory/classroom space. In
addition, observations will not record personally identifiable information so that performance
data cannot be tied to specific individuals. Another risk is the possibility of reinforcing
negative training during the accomplishment of simulated unusual attitude recovery. This
risk will be mitigated by providing instruction only regarding how to understand the AI
systems that will be presented, not regarding how to actually perform recovery procedures.
4. Benefits: You are not expected to benefit directly from participation in this research study.
5. Compensation: If you are active duty military you will receive your normal active duty pay.
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1. Alternatives: Your alternative is to choose not to participate in this study. Refusal to
participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. Notify one of the investigators of this study to discontinue.
8. Entitlements and confidentiality:
a. Records of your participation in this study may only be disclosed according to federal
law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its implementing regulations
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and its
implementing regulations, when applicable, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. Sec 552, and its implementing regulations when applicable. Your personal
information will be stored in a locked cabinet in an office that is locked when not
occupied. Electronic files containing your personal information will be password
protected and stored only on a secure server. Additionally, all surveys are anonymous and
are collected in unsupervised, yet secure, receptacles located in AFIT
laboratory/classroom space. In addition, observations will not record personally
identifiable information so that performance data cannot be tied to specific individuals. It
is intended that the only people having access to your information will be the researchers
named above and this study’s Medical Monitor or Consultant, the AFRL Wright Site
IRB, the Air Force Surgeon General’s Research Compliance office, the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering office or any other IRB involved in the review and
approval of this protocol. When no longer needed (after March 2014) for research
purposes your information will be destroyed in a secure manner (shredding) Complete
confidentiality cannot be promised, in particular for military personnel, whose health or
fitness for duty information may be required to be reported to appropriate medical or
command authorities. If such information is to be reported, you will be informed of what
is being reported and the reason for the report.
b. Your entitlements to medical and dental care and/or compensation in the event of injury
are governed by federal laws and regulations, and that if you desire further information
you may contact the base legal office (ASC/JA, 257-6142 for Wright-Patterson AFB).
The decision to participate in this research is completely voluntary on your part. No one may
coerce or intimidate you into participating in this program. Participate only if you want to, 2Lt
Robert Poisson or an associate, has adequately answered any and all questions you have about
this study, your participation, and the procedures involved. If you have any further questions,
2Lt Robert Poisson can be reached at (508) 212-5902. 2Lt Robert Poisson, or an associate will
be available to answer any questions concerning procedures throughout this study. If significant
new findings develop during the course of this research, which may relate to your decision to
continue participate or may affect the risk involved, you will be informed. Refusal to participate
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Notify one of the investigators of this study to discontinue. Additionally, the
investigator may
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c. terminate your participation in this study if she or he feels this to be in your best interest.
If you have any questions or concerns about your participation in this study or your rights
as a research subject, please contact Col William Butler at (937) 656 – 5436 or
william.butler2@wpafb.af.mil.
d. Your participation in this study may be filmed or audio/videotaped. The purpose of these
recordings is for accurate data analysis. Only the experimenters listed above will use
recording of your flight to match quantitative data to qualitative flight simulation
decisions that you made in order to ensure that the data and our understanding of it match
reality.
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. YOUR
SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING
READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE.
Volunteer Signature_________________________________________Date_______________
Volunteer Name (printed)_________________________________________
Advising Investigator Signature ______________________ Date _________________
Investigator Name (printed)_________________________________________
Witness Signature __________________________________Date _________________
Witness Name (printed)_________________________________________
We may wish to present some of the video/audio recordings from this study at scientific
conventions or use photographs in journal publications. If you consent to the use of your image
for publication or presentation in a scientific or academic setting, please sign below.
Volunteer Signature_________________________________________Date_______________
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Appendix E: List of Unusual Attitudes Used
1st Display.
Situation 1: 30 degrees up, 45 degrees right
Situation 2: 30 degrees down, 120 degrees left
Situation 3: 60 degrees up, 165 degrees right
Situation 4: 60 degrees down, 45 degrees left
Situation 5: 30 degrees up, 120 degrees right
Situation 6: 60 degrees down, 165 degrees left
2nd Display.
Situation 1
Situation 5
Situation 6
Situation 4
Situation 3
Situation 2
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